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Abstract 
 
 Every model of the consumer purchase journey includes an evaluation 
phase, during which consumers search for product attributes including price.  
While much has been written about search, knowledge uncertainty, and the role of 
price in continued search and purchase intent, very little, if any, empirical work 
has been done to understand the impact on the path to purchase when objective 
price is not available.  This study undertakes a field experiment with random 
assignment in a natural setting to examine the impacts on consumer behavior 
related to continued search, lead generation and purchase intent when objective 
price is not available.  The results provide evidence that the absence of objective 
price information during the evaluation stage of the purchase journey reduces 
search, lead generation and purchase intent. While this experiment was conducted 
in the context of a high cost, high involvement consumer product, many 
executives in B2B marketplaces would benefit from evidence of the impact of 
hiding price from B2B customers, providing a fertile area for future research. 
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Introduction 
Overview 
The consumer decision journey or purchase journey can be long and 
complex for high cost, high involvement products.  It can also be much simpler 
and more direct for low cost, low involvement products.  At the center of most 
models of the purchase journey is evaluation of the product under consideration 
for purchase.   The evaluation stage of the consumer purchase journey involves 
the search for information about the product including product attributes and 
price.   
There is robust literature that considers consumer search and the impacts 
of knowledge uncertainty on the extent of search and purchase intent (Ratchford, 
2001; Urbany, Dickson and Wilkie, 1989; Block, Sherrell and Ridgeway, 1986; 
Urbany, 1986; Zimmerman and Geistfeld, 1984; Stigler, 1961).   The literature on 
pricing is also rich and addresses issues from the consumer’s response to prices, 
framing of prices, how to price, and the impact of objective price, reference 
prices, and perceived price on purchase intent and much more (Krishna, Briesch, 
Lehmann and Yuan, 2002; Compeau and Grewal, 1998; Chen, Monroe, Yung-
Chien, 1998; Lichtenstein, Ridgway and Netemeyer, 1993; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979).  Nearly all of this research and pricing literature assumes that 
objective price information is readily available for search in the purchase journey. 
As Owen (2003) pointed out, there are many situations encountered by 
consumers where price information is missing or hidden.  In his exploratory work, 
Owen studies both low cost, low involvement products (such as milk at a 
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convenience store where price is not marked) and high cost, high involvement 
products (such as fine jewelry in a locked case with prices tags turned upside 
down).  Extant research suggests that missing prices for low cost, low 
involvement products would be expected to have little impact on continued search 
and purchase intent for these products because they are likely to be familiar to the 
purchaser, involve a single use and involve little risk.  High cost, high 
involvement products, on the other hand, tend to be durable products involving 
significant perceived risk, and price plays an important role in determining deal 
valuation, continued search and purchase intent (Shannahan, Dupuis, Bush, and 
Rocco, 2009; Owen, 2003; Bloch, et al., 1986; Urbany, 1986; Stigler, 1961).   
While nearly all of the search and pricing literature assumes that objective 
price information is readily available for search in the purchase journey there are 
industries of significance where price information is missing or very hard to find.  
While noted industries may not exhaust the list of industries that hide price, it 
does include all of the significant consumer product industries noted in an 
exhaustive review of the literature.  New boat and RV manufacturers and dealers 
typically do not publish prices on manufacturer, dealer or third-party websites or 
in printed product literature.  This is also true of in-ground pool manufacturers 
and dealers, some window manufacturers and dealers, and other consumer durable 
goods industries.  It is also true in professional services industries, including 
healthcare and legal services, where prices are not obvious or advertised.  There 
are more than 18,000 listings on RVTrader.com that do not include a price 
(Edwards, 2018).  And, a representative of BoatTrader.com reported directly to 
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the author that there are more than 29,000 new boat listings on BoatTrader.com 
that do not include a price.  
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS.gov), effective 
January 1, 2019, requires hospitals to publish a list of their standard charges on 
the internet (Glidden, 2018).  How this flows across other types of health services 
and providers and how it impacts consumer behavior in purchasing healthcare 
remains to be seen. In this heavily regulated industry, it does demonstrate the 
push for better pricing visibility for consumers.  In less regulated industries, 
changes will likely require a paradigm shift in management thinking about pricing 
visibility. 
Understanding of consumer decisions when objective price is not available 
and price knowledge is uncertain will fill a gap in the literature and provide 
valuable insights to companies that hide objective price in industries selling high 
cost, high involvement products.    There may be alternatives to hiding price and 
one intent of this study is to provide clear supporting evidence for companies and 
industries to re-consider this practice. 
Recreational boating is a significant industry.  According to the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, in their preliminary estimate of the Outdoor 
Recreation Satellite Account, in 2017 recreational boating and fishing accounted 
for $38.3 billion of gross economic output (U. S. Bureau of Economic Affairs, 
2018).  The National Marine Manufacturers Association’s Statistical Abstract of 
Recreational Boating (2018), reports that retail sales of new boats, engines, and 
trailers, alone, totaled $13.5 Billion in 2017.   
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Though new boat sales have been increasing for the past seven years they 
have been in a long-term decline for nearly forty years (NMMA Statistical 
Abstract of Recreational Boating, 2018).  Data on boat registrations for the past 
fifteen years, provided by Info-link (database of all boat registrations from 1996 
to the present), show that the number of first-time boat buyers has declined by 
37%.  That represents 106,000 fewer first time boat buyers in 2015 than in 2000 
(Discover Boating, 2017).  Reversing these trends and growing sales of new 
boats, and first-time boat buyers, is a key challenge of the industry.  The internet 
has created far greater transparency in pricing during the past twenty years, yet 
there are some remaining industries that do not display objective price, including 
new recreational boats.  Could the failure to display objective offering price in 
new powerboat advertisements be part of the cause for this steady erosion in new 
boat sales and first-time boat buyers?    Also, could the results of this research 
change the pricing practices of entire industries that do not publish objective 
offering price on manufacturer, dealer or third-party websites, or in printed 
product literature?  Clear supporting evidence from this study could be an impetus 
for management and industries to reconsider the practice of hiding objective price 
in their online and other advertising. 
 In interviews with boat manufacturers, as they were recruited for this study, 
they gave a number of reasons for not providing objective pricing information on 
their website, and for not allowing dealers to provide objective price on dealer 
websites or third-party websites.  These reasons reflect a belief system that 
influences their interactions with consumers and include: 
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• It encourages (requires) consumers to contact the dealer for 
pricing, allowing the dealer the opportunity to build a relationship 
– understand the needs of the customer and make suggestions on 
what options may best serve the customer’s needs; 
• Concern that a customer would compare our boats to the 
competition solely on price, without fully understanding the 
uniqueness of the products we build; 
• Competitors undercutting price.  While price sheets are available 
today the competition has to work a little harder to fully 
understand how our products compare to theirs;  
• MSRP pricing can be misleading to the retail customer as there is 
always some level of discounting off of MSRP and final selling 
price is different from dealer to dealer, based on percentage mark 
up the dealer needs to operate his dealership and freight costs. 
“Customers require price information when anticipating higher price points 
but are most sensitive to the effort involved in price search, perceived 
manipulation, and social pressures of interaction with sales associates... (Owen, 
2003, p. 140).”  A study of first-time boat buyers (Discover Boating, 2017) found 
that they were intimidated by the thought of contacting or visiting a boat dealer.  
The belief system of boat manufacturers and dealers described above, that leads 
them to advertise, “Request a Price” rather than provide an objective price, likely 
triggers the negative reactions Owen describes above.  This suggests that failing 
to offer an objective price in advertising for boats, and other high cost, high 
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involvement products, leaves the buyer feeling manipulated or forced to engage in 
a social interaction with a dealer they are not yet prepared for.  Could this delay, 
derail or terminate search and end the purchase journey?  And, in the age of 
pricing transparency created by the internet, could this be contributing to the long-
term decline discussed above? 
During the fifteen-year decline in new boat buyers mentioned above, the 
internet has led to many changes in consumer expectations, especially 
surrounding transparency, in the shopping experience, consumer search and the 
consumer purchase journey (Biswas, 2004; Su, 2008; Jiang, 2002).  Extant 
literature suggests that these missing prices could be limiting sales of new boats, 
RVs and other high cost, high involvement products where price is missing in the 
search process (Shannahan, et al., 2009; Owen, 2003; Bloch, et al., 1986; Urbany, 
1986; Stigler, 1961). 
Repeat boat buyers have experience in purchasing a boat and through 
experience likely have developed an internal reference price for a new boat of 
interest to them.  First time boat buyers likely lack this experience and are 
searching for information on a wide variety of product attributes including price.  
This is consistent with learning theory and the information seeking behaviors of 
new car purchasers (Bennet and Mandell 1969). 
Research undertaken for Discover Boating, a national boating promotion 
campaign, has concluded that for every 100 first-time boat buyers who enter the 
purchase funnel, only two buy a boat (Discover Boating, 2017).  The path to 
purchase is filled with excitement and disappointment as first-time boat buyers do 
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their research.  As the consumer purchase journey can be derailed at a number of 
points (dealer experience, discovery of hidden costs, lack of comprehensive 
research resources, lack of peers to consult), the purpose of this study is to 
understand how the lack of objective price information from manufacturers and 
dealers, and in particular on a popular national third-party website, impacts 
continued search for product attributes, lead generation and purchase intentions 
for new powerboats.   
Objectives and motivations 
Extant research demonstrates that objective price can impact perceived 
price, perceived quality, perceived value and purchase intention (Chang and Wildt 
1994).  But what is the impact on the purchase journey, including continued 
search for product attributes, lead generation, and purchase intention, when 
objective price information is not available?  The purpose of this research is to 
understand the impact on continued search for product attributes, lead generation 
and purchase intent when objective price information is missing.   In the context 
of this study, objective price is not provided by the new boat dealer in new boat 
listings on a major third-party website or by dealers or manufacturers on their 
own websites.   
This study undertakes the ambitious task of conducting a field experiment 
with random assignment in a natural environment to examine the impacts of 
missing prices for a high-cost, high involvement product on continued search for 
product attributes, lead generation, and purchase intent (as a proxy for product 
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sales).  While there has been significant work in the domain of pricing, there is a 
dearth of empirical research in the area of missing prices, and the impact of 
missing prices on continued search for product attributes, lead generation and 
purchase intent. Owens (2003) provided helpful exploratory work in this field and 
suggested future research on the extent customers use the internet in searching for 
price information in categories that typically omit or hide prices.  While not 
exactly responsive to Owens’ request for future research, this research does use 
the internet to test the impact of missing prices on continued search for product 
attributes, lead generation and purchase intent for new powerboats, a category that 
typically and historically has omitted objective price information from 
manufacturer, dealer and third-party websites and manufacturer product literature. 
Theoretical contributions 
This examination of missing prices on the purchase journey for high cost, 
high involvement products is unique from three perspectives.  First, in spite of the 
practice in some industries to hide objective price, there have been no empirical 
tests published of the impact of missing prices on continued search for product 
attributes, leads, and purchase intent for high cost, high involvement products.  
While there is a substantial body of work on pricing, there is a dearth of scenarios 
studied where objective price is missing.  This study is unique in seeking to 
understand the impact of missing prices on the purchase journey and fill in 
missing information in the extant literature.   
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Second, the proposed study is conducted as a field experiment with 
random assignment to obtain unbiased measures of continued search, lead 
generation and purchase intent for a high cost, high involvement product in a 
natural, online context.   This field experiment seeks to provide causal findings of 
the impact of missing objective price on the dependent variables being measured. 
The experiment is being done in a natural environment in which consumers 
searching to purchase a boat visit a third-party website in the normal course of 
their daily lives.  In this randomized experiment, the visitors are randomly 
assigned to the treatment group (objective price is visible) or the control group 
(objective price is not visible).  Random assignment facilitates causal inference by 
making samples randomly similar to each other so that subjects in the treatment 
group and control group will both have the same average characteristics (Cook, 
Campbell & Shadish, 2002).  This helps to rule out alternative causes because the 
only difference between the groups is the treatment.  Random assignment reduces 
the likelihood of potential confounding causes as they are no more likely to 
happen in the treatment group than in the control group (Cook, et al., 2002). 
“Randomized experiments are the most potent research design for determining 
whether or not x causes y (Highhouse, 2009, p. 554).”  
Third, the results of this study are based on consumer behaviors in a real-
world purchase journey (real consumers considering the purchase of real 
products) rather than on decisions consumers “might make” in a hypothetical 
purchase journey, as seen in other studies.    This study furthers understanding of 
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the extent to which information (and in this case price information) drives the 
behavior of buyers in the marketplace as was suggested by Urbany (1986). 
Finally, much of the research that has been done on the price of consumer 
goods, focuses on the impacts of various aspects of price at the point of sale.  This 
research examines the impact of missing prices during the information search 
portion of the purchase journey and likely much earlier in the purchase journey 
than research focused at the point of sale. 
Managerial contributions 
 Interviews with executives in the recreational boating and RV industries 
identified that there are high level discussions within these companies about the 
appropriateness of hiding price in the internet era, where greater transparency is 
expected.  There is reluctance to change decades old practices without compelling 
evidence to guide their decision on this matter.   This study seeks to provide 
evidence to help manufacturers and dealers in industries that hide price answer 
that very important question.  Evidence from this study will provide support for a 
fundamental change in the way industries, that currently hide or omit objective 
price, approach the availability of price information made available to consumers.  
The findings could positively impact product sales in a significant manner in 
those industries where objective price is missing during the evaluation stage of the 
purchase journey. 
Manufacturers in industries that hide or omit objective price do so largely 
due to pressure from their retail dealer networks.  The results of this study may 
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provide manufacturers in industries that hide or omit objective price with 
evidence to overcome the objections of their dealer networks.  Dealers, as well as 
their manufacturers, want increased product sales.  If this study provides support 
for the assertion that the availability of objective price information during the 
search process leads to increased search, lead generation and purchase intent, it 
would be difficult evidence to ignore in industries selling high price, high 
involvement products. 
Outline of the study 
This study is organized in six chapters.  The second chapter is the review 
of literature including a discussion of the purchase journey, level of involvement, 
uncertainty and search, extent of search, economics of information theory, 
knowledge and choice uncertainty, pricing theory and purchase intent.  Chapter 
three covers the proposed model development and the development of Hypotheses 
supported by theory and prior research.  The fourth chapter discusses the research 
methodology including the measures used, and the study design. Chapter five 
provides the results of the study and the Hypothesis testing. Chapter six is a 
discussion of the research findings, managerial and theoretical implications of 
findings, the limitations of this research, suggestions for future research and 
concluding observations.  
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Literature Review 
This chapter is divided into seven sections.  This chapter begins by defining the 
consumer purchase journey including a discussion of the central role of 
information search and evaluation in the consumer purchase journey.  A model of 
the traditional consumer purchase journey and a contemporary model of the 
consumer purchase journey are presented in Figure 1. Next, relevant literature and 
research analysis on the level of involvement and uncertainty in search, extent of 
search, economics of information theory and its application to search, and theory 
related to knowledge and choice uncertainty are discussed. The final sections 
discuss relevant literature and research analysis related to pricing theory, the role 
of price, how the lack of objective price impacts concepts in the pricing literature, 
and the use of purchase intent as a proxy for sales. 
The purchase journey 
The consumer decision process is a journey, also referred to as the 
purchase journey.  Norton and Pine (2013) describe it as sequence of events that 
customers go through to learn about, purchase and interact with products.  The 
consumer decision process, or purchase journey, has been conceptualized as a 
purchase funnel. Consumers move in a linear manner through the stages of the 
purchase funnel.  Until recently, these purchase funnel concepts concluded with 
the purchase of the product, but more contemporary conceptualizations include 
post-purchase evaluation, product advocacy and continuous evaluation due to the 
rise of social media and customer reviews.   
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Hall and Towers (2017) suggest that consumer decision making moves 
through stages from problem recognition, information search, evaluation of 
alternatives, product choice and purchase evaluation (Blackwell, Miniard and 
Engel, 2006; Olshavsky and Granbois, 1979; Darley, Blankson and Luethge, 
2010).  Others discuss awareness, interest and final decision (DeBruyn and Lilien, 
2008); awareness, consideration, evaluation, purchase and use (Nunes, Bellin, Lee 
and Schunck, 2013); consider, evaluate, purchase, enjoy, advocate, bond (Hudson 
and Hudson, 2013). Wu (2001) summarizes an effect hierarchy model developed 
by Lavidge and Steiner (1961) into three general processes, “1. Gaining 
awareness and knowledge about the product, 2. Developing an attitude toward the 
product, and 3. Making the purchase decision (Wu, 2001, p. 44.).” 
Nunes, et al. (2013) share Accenture’s non-stop customer experience 
model developed to recognize the impacts of the internet and social media on the 
purchase journey and compare it to a traditional conceptualization of the purchase 
funnel.  The Accenture model suggests that evaluation continues after purchase 
and during use as consumers are on a continuous, non-stop decision journey, 
which is noted in Figure 1. 
What all models of the purchase journey have in common is an evaluation 
stage.  In the evaluation stage the consumer searches for product information, 
including product attributes and price, before they make their purchase decision.  
Information search as part of evaluation, therefore, is at the center of most models 
of the purchase journey, including both traditional and contemporary models.   
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For decades, how consumers make decisions has been a central question 
of marketing and consumer behavior research.  Nunes, et al., (2103) state, “The 
new Rule #1 is, know your customer’s behavior on their path to purchase (p. 50).” 
Acknowledging this rule and the centrality of information search in the evaluation 
stage of the path to purchase, it is important to understand how missing 
information, in particular, missing objective prices, affects continued search, lead 
generation and purchase intent for high cost, high involvement products. 
Level of involvement, uncertainty and search 
Information search plays a critical role during the evaluation phase of the 
path to purchase.  The research question in this study involves the search for price 
information for a high cost, high involvement product and the impact on 
continued search, lead generation and purchase intent when objective price 
information is not available.  How consumer behaviors differ when objective 
price is not available and price knowledge is uncertain will provide valuable 
insights to companies that hide objective price in industries selling high cost, high 
involvement products and will fill a gap in the literature. 
What does the literature mean by involvement?  “Involvement refers to 
how much money, time, thought, energy and other resources consumers devote 
for purchasing a product.  It is one of the fundamental concepts used to explain 
the consumer buying process (Solanki, 2013, p. 56).” 
Low cost, low involvement products are likely to be familiar to the 
purchaser, involve a single use and involve little risk.  High cost, high 
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involvement products, on the other hand, tend to be durable products involving 
significant perceived risk and price plays an important role in determining deal 
valuation, continued search and purchase intent (Shannahan, Dupuis, Bush, and 
Rocco, 2009; Owen, 2003; Bloch, et al., 1986; Urbany, 1986; Stigler, 1961).  The 
context for this study is the recreational boating industry and recreational 
powerboats are a high cost, high involvement product.  This study seeks to 
understand the behavior of consumers at the evaluation stage of the purchase 
journey who are engaged in search for a new recreational powerboat. 
“Customers are more willing to search for price information when 
purchase price risk is high (e.g., durable goods), where range of prices for the 
same item is wide (e.g., car dealer to car dealer), and where product variability 
can signal high price variability (e.g., fine jewelry).  Yet consumers continue to 
encounter many shopping situations where prices are missing, hidden or vaguely 
described (Owens 2003, p. 136).”  In the case of recreational powerboats, all three 
of these conditions exist which should indicate a high willingness to search for 
information in the evaluation stage of the path to purchase of a new powerboat.   
Radder and Huang (2007) suggest that symbolic meaning, image 
reinforcement or psychological stimulation may also be involved in the purchase 
of a high involvement product (Solomon, 1986).  All of these factors, symbolic 
meaning, image reinforcement and psychological stimulation, are frequently 
involved in the purchase of a new recreational powerboat further identifying new 
recreational powerboats as a high involvement product. 
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Extent of search 
There is usually greater complexity in a high involvement product leading 
to more thought, more search and longer journey times (Hall et al., 2017).  
Zimmerman and Geistfeld (1984) reported, in their study of economic factors 
affecting search, that their results “lends support to the idea that consumers are 
influenced in their search efforts by the relative size of the expenditure 
(Zimmerman, et al., 1984, p. 129).”  All businesses would rather sell a product 
today than tomorrow, next week, next month or in the future.  Missing 
information that further lengthens the purchase journey or, worse, derails the 
search and purchase journey would not seem to be in a seller’s best interest.  
Empirical evidence provided by this study of the impacts of missing objective 
prices could help to change the belief system described above and result in more 
product sales.   
Bloch, et al. (1986) developed a framework for consumer information 
search.  The framework modeled pre-purchase search and ongoing search, the 
latter being the primary subject of their study.  Involvement in the purchase was a 
primary determinant of pre-purchase search.  Making a better purchase decision is 
considered the consumer’s primary motive for search.  The outcomes of pre-
purchase search were increased product and market knowledge, better purchase 
decisions and increased satisfaction with the purchase outcome.   
Encouraging search to the point of preparedness to purchase is desirable if 
the goal is to sell more product.  Delaying, derailing or terminating search is 
likely to result in the consumer delaying a purchase or abandoning the purchase 
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journey. The extent of product search is influenced by the availability of product 
information and the time available to search, among other things (Bloch, et al., 
1986).  The extent of search is also influenced by the benefit to be derived from 
additional search compared to the cost of additional search (Stigler, 1961). Most 
search literature is concerned with price search.  If an objective price is not 
available on dealer, manufacturer or third-party websites, or in product literature, 
the extent of search is likely to be minimized or search terminated because 
objective price cannot be found.   
  As Owen (2003) suggested, the requirement to visit a dealer to get price 
information likely leaves the customer feeling manipulated, lacking price 
knowledge and bargaining power and uncomfortable being forced into a social 
interaction with the dealer the customer may not be ready for.  If the consumer is 
not ready or willing to visit the dealer, it is likely search is dramatically reduced 
or terminated.  This could play a significant role in the research findings by 
Discover Boating that only 2% of first-time boat buyers that reach the awareness 
and interest stage of the purchase journey proceed to the purchase stage. 
(Discover Boating, 2017) 
Economics of Information theory 
 Economics of Information theory suggests that expected benefit is a 
strong determinant of the amount of search undertaken by the consumer.  The 
effect of price dispersion on the extent of search has been the subject of several 
studies.  Greater dispersion of prices across different sellers encourages greater 
search because the benefits of search (potential savings) are greater when there is 
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a wide dispersion of prices than when there is a narrow dispersion of prices 
(Biswas, 2004; Urbany, 1986; Zimmerman, et al., 1984; Stigler, 1961).  However, 
there have been no empirical studies of the extent of search if no objective price 
information is available for a product.  When objective price information is not 
easily accessible in the search process, there is no understanding of the dispersion 
of prices and therefore no benefit to continued price search.  This suggests that the 
absence of objective price information disrupts the path to purchase.  The path to 
purchase for a new powerboat buyer can be twelve months or longer (Discover 
Boating, 2017). The cost of visiting multiple boat dealers to search for price is 
very high and unlikely to be undertaken unless you are ready to buy.  Search 
theory suggests that consumers path to being ready to buy will be much longer 
without availability of objective price information. 
“From the manufacturer’s point of view, uncertainty concerning his price 
is clearly disadvantageous. The cost of search is a cost of purchase, and 
consumption will therefore be smaller… (Stigler, 1961, p. 223).”  The Economics 
of Information theory then suggests that hiding price which increases the cost of 
search is disadvantageous to the manufacturers and dealers because consumption 
will be smaller. 
Knowledge and choice uncertainty 
Price uncertainty is part of uncertainty about the product and product 
category.  Consistent with Stigler’s Economics of Information theory, research 
has shown that knowledge uncertainty reduces the consumer’s search for more 
information and choice uncertainty increases consumer search effort (Urbany, et 
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al., 1989).  Consumers who lack knowledge about the product category (such as 
first-time buyers) face a more difficult search task than consumers more certain 
about their knowledge (repeat buyers).  Knowledge uncertainty may increase 
search costs to the point that search is reduced or diminished (Stigler, 1961; 
Urbany, et al., 1989). To the extent manufacturers and dealers of new boats do not 
provide objective price information, it increases knowledge uncertainty and may 
be a factor in derailing first time powerboat buyers’ search (and even repeat 
buyers’ search), resulting in fewer sales of new boats to both first time and repeat 
powerboat buyers.  Hence, only 2% who enter the purchase journey end up 
purchasing their first powerboat. 
Choice uncertainty increases search effort.  According to Urbany, et al. 
(1989), increasing knowledge (by providing objective price information) may 
increase choice uncertainty (by bringing more alternative products into the 
consideration set) leading to greater search, which can also be characterized as 
greater engagement in the search process.  Greater choice uncertainty leading to 
greater search could be better for the product category as a rising sea lifts all boats 
(and boat manufacturers and dealers). Again, visiting a boat dealer can be 
intimidating, and particularly so for first time boat buyers (Discover Boating 
2017).  If this is the only way they can get price information, extant research 
suggests that missing prices could lead to reduced or abandoned search.  
Other authors have considered the information inference processes used 
by consumers when only partial information is available in a choice environment 
(Ross and Creyer, 1992).   Their results suggest that when there is missing 
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information, consumers first look for similar information on other brands and then 
to same brand similar information to infer the value of the missing information.  
Where information on the attribute in question (for purposes of this study, 
objective price) is not available from other brands or other models of the same 
brand, it is not likely the consumer will be able to infer the value of the missing 
information.   
High price, high involvement products, by definition, are discretionary 
purchases.  They are not necessities for the most part. Owen (2003) states that in 
the absence of purchase necessity (e.g., boats), many customers feel that in the 
category of high price, high involvement products, the purchase can wait for 
another time when the price is clearer.  This suggests that it is likely customers in 
the evaluation and information gathering stage of the purchase journey who are 
unable to find objective pricing information easily accessible on manufacturer, 
dealer and/or third-party websites, and are unable to infer objective price 
information from other brands or models within brand, move on and do not 
continue their search for information that would eventually result in a lead and/or 
purchase. 
As a high price, high involvement product, the perception of boating is 
that it is expensive. The same would be true for other examples of high price, high 
involvement products mentioned above.   Hiding prices likely reinforces that 
perception. “If consumers assume the price may be too expensive and not 
affordable, learning the exact price may not be worth the trouble (Owens 2003, p. 
140).”  This suggests that by not making it easy for potential boat buyers to find 
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information on objective price, the industry derails the purchase journey either 
temporarily or permanently. 
Pricing theory 
Krishna’s statement that “pricing is one of the most crucial determinants 
of sales,” is likely why the literature on pricing is so robust (Krishna, Briesch, 
Lehmann and Yuan, 2002, p. 101).  Extant research addresses issues from the role 
of price, consumer’s response to prices, price presentation, the role of price 
perceptions on behavioral intentions, comparative pricing, the impact of objective 
price, reference prices, and perceived price on purchase intent, the impact of price 
on transaction value and acquisition value, and much more (Krishna, et al., 2002; 
Varki and Colgate, 2001; Compeau and Grewal, 1998; Chen, Monroe, Yung-
Chien, 1998; Grewal, Monroe, and Krishnan, 1998; Lichtenstein, Ridgway and 
Netemeyer, 1993; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Nearly all of this research and 
pricing literature assumes that objective price information is readily available as 
the consumer is making a purchase decision or during the evaluation phase of the 
purchase journey.  This study examines the impact on consumer decisions and the 
purchase journey when objective price is not available. 
What is the role of pricing?  In a market for a high price, high involvement 
product, if objective price is not available, what cues or messaging about the 
product is the customer missing?  The role price plays in consumer decisions 
about high cost, high involvement products is multi-dimensional 
(Chandrashekaran, 2012; Yin and Paswan, 2007; Darke and Chung, 2005; 
Chandrashekaran, 2004; Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin, 2003; Varki, et al., 2001; 
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Compeau, et al., 1998; Grewal, et al., 1998; Urbany, Bearden and Weilbacher, 
1988: Chang, et al., 1994; Dodd, Monroe and Grewal, 1991; Monroe, 1990; 
Zeithamel, 1988; Erickson and Johansson, 1985).  
The discussion below looks at the critical dimensions of pricing related to 
high cost, high involvement products including the traditional economic 
perspective of price, price as an indicator of quality, the role of price in purchase 
intent, how price affects perceived value, transaction value and acquisition value, 
and the role of objective price in formation of internal and external reference 
price.   
The Dual Role of Price  
In the traditional economic perspective, price is a constraint.  Consumers 
seek to maximize utility by allocating a limited budget across a range of products 
and services (Erickson et al., 1985).  In any purchase, the consumer gives 
something up to get something in return.  They get a bundle of benefits or value 
and give or sacrifice the price in return for the benefits.  The value of the benefits 
received are expected to exceed the price paid. 
Several studies have also examined price as an indicator of the quality of 
the product under consideration (Varki, et al, 2001; Grewal, et al, 1998; Chang, et 
al., 1994). The expectation is bi-directional.  Consumers expect to pay more for 
higher quality and when they pay more, they expect to receive higher quality 
(Monroe, 1990). The extent to which price is used as an indication of quality is 
somewhat dependent on the availability of information on quality related 
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attributes.  And, the more information available on quality related attributes, the 
less important price is as an indicator of quality (Erickson, et al., 1985). 
Price also plays a significant role in explaining consumer purchase intent.  
Erickson, et al. (1985) concluded that price plays a dual role and has both a 
positive and negative effect on purchase intent.  The negative effect is related to 
price as a constraint, while the positive effect is through the positive effect of 
price on quality perception and attitude. 
“In the case of price, we found that price has, basically, two roles.  The 
first is as a positive influence on quality perceptions (which, in turn, reinforce 
beliefs about price), and through this as a positive influence on attitude and 
intention. The other major role of price is as a negative direct influence on 
intention (Erickson, et al., 1985, p.198).”  The negative influence on intention is a 
purely a classic economic view of price. 
The Behavioral Role of Price  
A behavioral perspective of price concludes that price also affects the 
perceived value of the purchase, through its impact on acquisition value and 
transaction value, and perceived value positively influences purchase intention 
(Grewal, et al., 1998; Compeau, et al., 1998; Chandrashekaran, 2004).  From a 
consumer behavior perspective, objective price has an indirect positive effect on 
purchase intent through perceived price, acquisition value and transaction value. 
Transaction value represents the extent to which consumers feel they got a 
good deal on the purchase.  It is operationalized as consumer perceptions of how 
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attractive the deal is relative to some internal reference price (IRP).  The 
determinants of transaction value include IRP and contextual factors like the 
presence of an advertised comparative price, known as an advertised reference 
price or external reference price (ERP) (Chandrashekaran, 2004). Objective price 
compared to a reference price (IRP or ERP) determines the perceived value of the 
deal or transaction value to the consumer.  If there is no objective price present 
during purchase evaluation a necessary component to determining perceived 
value is missing. 
Researchers have defined acquisition value as the perceived net gains 
associated with the product purchased (Dodds, Monroe and Grewal, 1991; 
Zeithaml, 1988).  Chandrashekaran (2004) defines acquisition value as the 
consumer’s assessment of the perceived value of the benefits received from the 
purchase relative to the perceived price paid for those benefits and is determined 
by the perceived quality of the product and the transaction value.  Since objective 
price influences transaction value and transaction value is one of the determinants 
of acquisition value, objective price also influences, indirectly, acquisition value. 
There is a large body of work on reference pricing (Chandrashekaran, 
2012; Yin, et al., 2007; Darke, et al., 2005; Chandrashekaran, 2004; Kopalle, et 
al., 2003; Krishna, et al., 2002; Varki, et. al., 2001; Chen, et al., 1998; Campeau, 
et. al., 1998; Grewal, et al., 1998; Chang, et al., 1994; Suter and Burton, 1996; 
Urbany, et al., 1998; Lichtenstein, Burton and Karson, 1991.) Reference price is 
generally divided into two types of reference price.  Reference price is either an 
internal standard or external standard against which the objective price offered by 
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the seller is measured.  That is, reference price can be anchored internally or 
externally (Yin and Paswan, 2007). “Internal reference price (IRP) is defined as a 
price (or price scale) in buyer’s memories that serves as the basis for judging or 
comparing actual prices (Grewal, et al., 1998, p. 47).”  IRP is influenced by 
previous and current encounters with price and can change with exposure to new 
information. 
External reference price is usually discussed in the context of comparison 
pricing which has its own rich literature.  Actual product prices are compared with 
higher comparison prices supplied by the retailer to provide an external reference 
against which the offered priced can be evaluated (Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin, 
2003).  Researchers have examined the presentation or framing of ERP (Darke 
and Chung, 2005; Chandrashekaran, 2004; Chen, et al., 1998), the impact of ERPs 
that are believable or unbelievable (Compeau, et al., 1998; Suter and Burton, 
1996), the effect of semantic cues on reference price ads (Lichtenstein, Burton 
and Karson, 1991), the impact of ERP on IRP (Chandrashekaran, 2012; Urbany, 
Bearden and Weilbaker, 1988), on perceived savings (Krishna, et al., 2002), on 
perceived price (Chang, et al., 1994), and more. 
Reference Price Without Objective Price  
When objective price is not available in the search process, as in the case 
of many new recreational powerboats, RVs, in-ground swimming pools, 
windows, healthcare and legal services, many of these pricing concepts don’t 
apply or apply very differently.  If objective price is not displayed on 
manufacturer, dealer or third-party websites, then no comparative ERP is 
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displayed either.  So how does the consumer evaluate the value of the deal or even 
know what the deal is?  If the consumer is a repeat boat buyer, they may have an 
IRP.  But if they are a first-time boat buyer their knowledge of pricing for new 
boats may be very undeveloped.  Whether a consumer has formed an IRP based 
on a little knowledge or a lot of knowledge, they still have no objective price to 
compare it to when objective price is missing.  This will make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the consumer to create an assessment of transaction value or 
acquisition value.  Unable to determine what the deal is or the value of the deal, 
and given continued search efforts are not likely to yield the objective price short 
of visiting the dealer, it is suggested that the consumer abandons their search and 
the path to purchase; if not completely, at least until later. 
If the dealer or manufacturer provides an objective price for consideration 
by the consumer, there is evidence that this offering price will serve as an anchor 
and be used by the consumer to adjust their IRP (Chandrashekaran, 2004). 
Assimilation-Contrast Theory proposed by Sherif (1963) suggests that in the 
absence of other price information, an objective price advertised by the retailer 
will shift their IRP through an assimilation effect (Sen, 2009). In this case, the 
objective price and ERP are the same, at least until more price information can be 
obtained by visiting a dealer.  
Varki, et al. (2001) conclude that “price perceptions have an important 
influence on customer value perceptions.  In addition, by managing the 
comparative price perceptions of their customers, managers could simultaneously 
influence overall customer satisfaction and behavioral intentions (p. 238).”  The 
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objective price becomes a point of reference by which to judge the value of the 
offering that doesn’t exist when price is absent.  This suggests that the presence of 
an objective price has the benefit of influencing customer value perceptions, 
transaction value and purchase intentions whereas the absence of an objective 
price does not help, and may prevent, the consumer in developing value 
perceptions that could positively impact purchase intent. 
Formation of reference price (including IRP) depends, to a great extent, on 
the availability of information about products and their prices (Grewal, et al., 
1998).  When objective price is missing, a key piece of information needed to 
form reference price is missing.  Frankenberger and Liu (1994) suggest that, “As 
customers acquire new information about market prices, IRPs are adjusted to 
account for that information (p. 238).”  Unknowledgeable customers may accept 
the objective price as an internal reference point that influences purchase intent 
(Frankenberger, et al., 1994). And, Chandrashekaran (2012) states, “It is generally 
established in the literature that consumers may use some external reference 
prices to adjust internal reference prices, which in turn affects evaluation (p. 54).” 
Consumers usually compare the offering price (objective price) to their IRP in 
evaluating the favorability of a purchase, so any effect on the IRP will influence 
purchase evaluations (Lichtenstein, et al., 1991).  Yin, et al., (2007) recommend 
based on their study of antecedents of consumer reference price orientation, that 
managers should provide more price related information to help customers form 
external reference prices.  All of this supports the notion that manufacturers and 
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dealers of new powerboats would be better served by providing an objective price 
than by hiding price. 
In their meta-analysis on comparative pricing, Campeau, et al., (1998) 
conclude that comparison pricing works.  Grewal, et al., (1998) report their results 
“suggest that acquisition value has considerable influence on buyers’ willingness 
to buy (p. 56).” This suggests that providing an objective price in a market where 
none exist, allows for a comparison of objective price and IRP that should 
influence continued search, lead generation and, purchase intent.  Varki, et al., 
(2001) suggest studying their behavioral intention model in an experimental 
setting.  In this long stream of research on pricing, no one has looked at the 
impact of missing prices on the evaluation and search phase of the purchase 
journey and related lead generation and purchase intent. 
Purchase intent 
Purchase intent is a measure of the consumer’s willingness to purchase.  It 
has been defined as the likelihood of purchasing the product.  It is often 
considered an important indicator of actual purchase (Chang, et al., 1994).  Prior 
research has predominantly used purchase intent as a proxy for actual purchase 
(Morwitz, Steckel and Gupta, 2007; Weathers, Swain, and Makienko, 2015; 
Gamliel and Herstein, 2012; Teng, 2009; Compeau, et al., 1998; 
Chandrashekaran, 2004; Chen, et al, 1998).  Purchase intentions are used 
extensively by academics as proxy measures for purchase behavior.  They are also 
used by marketing managers to predict sales for new and existing products 
(Morwitz, et al., 2007). 
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In the experiment used in this study, there are three dependent variables.  
One is continued search for product attributes.  The other two are lead generation 
and purchase intent.  Lead generation might be considered a proxy for purchase 
intent as purchase intent is considered a proxy for purchase.  Lead generation is 
used in this study because nearly all purchasers of new powerboats start as leads.  
Not all leads end up as purchasers so lead generation is not a good proxy for 
purchase.  One would expect, however, that the more qualified leads a dealer gets, 
the more sales they will close and the more opportunity they have to close sales. 
Based on interviews with boat manufacturers and dealers in the recreational 
boating industry, lead generation is an important metric for all marketing 
expenditures made by new powerboat manufacturers and dealers. 
While actual purchases would be the best measure of the impact of 
missing prices on the purchase journey, the time frame for the purchase decision 
can extend to six months, twelve months, or twenty-four months, making it 
difficult to get actual purchase information in a timely manner. “Many surveys 
contain purchase intentions questions on such items as new food products, 
frequently purchased package goods, appliances, automobiles, and capital 
equipment. The time frame may range from one week to 24 months (Morrison, 
1979, p. 65).”  Morrison (1979) refers to six months, twelve months and twenty-
four months in assessing purchase intent for household appliances and 
automobiles, both high cost, high involvement products, and notes that very few 
published studies are able to obtain purchase intent and actual purchase behavior 
on the same set of individuals.  The purchase journey for new powerboats, also a 
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high cost, high involvement, durable good, is typically nine to twelve months or 
more.   
Morwitz, et al., (2007) studied the factors associated with a strong 
correlation between purchase intentions and actual purchase.  The six key findings 
of Morwitz, et al., (2007, p. 347) “indicate that intentions are more correlated with 
purchases: 
1. For existing products than new ones; 
2. For durable goods than for non-durable goods; 
3. For short than long term horizons;  
4. When respondents are asked to provide intentions for specific brands or 
models than when they are asked to provide intentions to buy at the 
product category level; 
5. When purchases are measured in terms of trial rates than when they are 
measured in terms of total market sales; and 
6. When purchase intentions are measured in a comparative mode than 
when they are collected monadically.” 
Morwitz, et al., (2007) conclude that their results “indicate that purchase 
intentions are predictive of future behavior” and more predictive for products that 
conform to these six factors (p. 361). “Intentions will be more predictive of 
behavior when the consequences of purchasing are great, and consumers therefore 
deliberate considerably about the purchase decision (e.g., purchasing a high 
involvement durable good) (Morwitz, et al., 2007, p. 361).” 
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This literature suggests that using purchase intent as a proxy for purchase 
behavior is a reasonable approach.  In this study, which considers purchase intent 
for new recreational powerboats, all six of the factors identified by Morwitz, et 
al., (2007) that lead to high intention-behavior correlations are present and map to 
this product:   
1. Respondents are asked to rate their purchase intent for an existing product, 
a recreational powerboat that is available for purchase in real time.  While 
there are refinements and enhancement to new models every year, the 
recreational powerboat is not a new product concept.   
2. Recreational powerboats are a high cost, high involvement, durable good.  
Purchase decisions for this type of product are seen as very important to 
the purchaser.   
3. While, Moritz, et al., (2007) suggest the correlation between purchase intent 
and purchase is high for short term versus long term purchase horizons, 
they acknowledge that for a high cost, high involvement, durable good, the 
strength of the relationship may increase over time as consumers may 
underestimate how long it will take to make the purchase decision and 
needing more time to complete the purchase is common.     
4. Respondents will also be asked their purchase intent for specific models 
they have viewed on a third-party website after becoming a lead for that 
powerboat model for the listing dealer.  So, they are being asked to 
indicate purchase intentions at the brand/model level and not the product 
category level.   
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5. Purchase intention will be measured as a proportion of people that intend to 
buy and not as a measure of market sales.  
6. Survey participants will be asked if they searched on other brands and 
models of boats.  The assumption is that respondents will have done 
extensive search of comparative products so that measurement of purchase 
intentions is being done in a comparative mode. 
This provides strong support for using purchase intent as a proxy for purchase 
in this study.  Recreational powerboats map directly to each of the six factors 
identified by Morwitz, et al., (2007) that lead to high intention-behavior 
correlations.  As a high cost, high involvement product, we can expect purchase 
intentions for recreational powerboats to be strongly predictive because the 
consequences of purchasing a powerboat are great, and consumers do deliberate 
considerably about the purchase decision, often taking six to twelve months are 
more to make the purchase decision. 
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Model Development and Hypotheses 
 
This chapter draws from the relevant literature to develop a model and 
testable hypotheses based on the theoretical relationships between price visibility 
and extent of search, knowledge uncertainty, economics of information theory, 
pricing theory and purchase intent.  A graphical depiction of the proposed 
hypothesized relationships is presented in Figure 2. 
This study will use a natural experiment to examine if an objective price 
versus the absence of objective price has a causal impact on purchase intention, as 
well as on continued product attribute search and lead generation.  It looks at two 
purchase journeys, with and without objective price, and how they map against 
each other.    
As suggested by Stigler (1961), search cost is part of the cost of a product; 
increasing search cost increases the cost of the product; and, search will continue 
to the point where the costs of search outweigh the benefits of search.   Where an 
objective offering price is missing, it increases the purchaser’s knowledge 
uncertainty. The literature supports that knowledge uncertainty may increase 
search costs to the point that search is reduced or diminished (Urbany, et al. 
1989).  The extent of product search is influenced by the availability of product 
information and the time available to search, among other things. (Bloch, 1986).  
Where it is common practice in an industry to hide price (such as the recreational 
powerboat, RV, in-ground pool, and healthcare industries, among others) 
additional search, short of a visit to a dealership, is nearly futile. The 
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unavailability of price information during the evaluation phase of the purchase 
journey is predicted to decrease the extent of continued product search.  
Therefore, making price information available (on manufacturer, dealer and third-
party websites), especially for a high price, high involvement product, is predicted 
to encourage additional search for information about the product rather than 
reduce or terminate additional search.  This leads to the first two Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Consumer search is influenced negatively by the 
absence of an objective offering price for a high price, high 
involvement product as demonstrated by less search for other 
product attributes. 
Hypothesis 2: Consumer search is influenced positively by the 
presence of an objective offering price for a high price, high 
involvement product as demonstrated by greater search for other 
product attributes. 
Knowledge uncertainty is reduced in the presence of objective offering 
price information. Greater knowledge is predicted to impact search for product 
attributes and price in a positive manner (Urbany, et al., 1989; Stigler, 1961).  
Greater search indicates greater engagement in the purchase journey.  Higher 
levels of engagement are common for high price, high involvement products.  
“Product involvement appears to be a basic determinant of ongoing search. 
(Bloch, et al., 1986, p. 123).”  The availability of an objective offering price also 
has multiple effects in aiding the consumer to recognize and evaluate the deal.  
Prior work has provided evidence that the availability of an objective offering 
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price (versus no objective offering price being available) will likely influence the 
consumer’s internal reference price which is adjusted based on the offering price 
(Sen, 2009; Chandrashekaran, 2004).  This allows for the formation of a 
perceived price by the consumer.  This perceived price combines with perceived 
quality to create a perceived value of the product.  The presence of an objective 
offering price allows the consumer to create an assessment of transaction value 
and acquisition value as well (Varki, et al., 2001).  This is not possible in the 
absence of an objective offering price.  The highest level of search for a high cost, 
high involvement product (such as a recreational powerboat, RV or in-ground 
swimming pool) involves contacting a dealer for more information.  At this point, 
the consumer has become a lead for the dealer.  Nearly all purchasers of these 
type of products become a lead during the path to purchase.   
Based on information from interviews with boat dealers, even though they 
do not display objective price on websites or in marketing materials they do 
receive leads on these new boat brands and models.  These leads are received 
even though an objective offering price is not available in advance of the 
consumer becoming a lead.  A consumer contacting a dealer to become a lead has 
some level of interest or intent to purchase.  Providing objective offering price 
reduces knowledge uncertainty and allows the consumer to make an assessment 
of perceived value, transaction value and acquisition value (Chandrashekaran, 
2004; Grewal, et al., 1998; Compeau, et al., 1998). It is predicted that greater 
knowledge certainty and improved value assessments that result from availability 
of objective selling price information, will not only result in more leads being 
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generated but stronger levels of purchase intent for those consumers who have 
objective offering price information available.  More leads and stronger purchase 
intent should translate into more sales.  The purchase journey for some high cost, 
high involvement products can be as much as nine to twelve months or more.  
Morwitz, et al., (2007) identified six factors that lead to a high correlation 
between intention and purchase behavior (existing products, durable goods, short 
term purchase horizon, asked to provide intentions for specific brands or models, 
when measured in terms of trial rates, and when measured in comparative mode).  
Based on these factors, it is appropriate in this study to use purchase intent as a 
proxy for purchase, as many academic researchers have done. 
Based on the evidence related to search (Bloch, et al., 1986; Owens, 2003; 
Stigler, 1961), knowledge uncertainty (Ross and Creyer, `1992; Urbany, et al., 
1989) and pricing (Chandrashekaran, 2004; Compeau, et al., 1998; Erickson, et 
al., 1985; Grewal, et al., 1998; Krishna, et al., 2002) it is predicted that the 
availability of an objective offering price will increase leads to dealers of these 
products and increase the purchase intent of the consumers who become leads.  
This leads to four additional Hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3: Less leads will be generated in the absence of an 
objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product. 
Hypothesis 4: More leads will be generated in the presence of an 
objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product. 
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Hypothesis 5: Purchase intent will be weaker in the absence of an 
objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product. 
Hypothesis 6: Purchase intent will be stronger in the presence of an 
objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product. 
  All of the hypothesized relationships, H1 through H6, are shown in Figure 
2. 
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Research Methodology 
This chapter is a discussion of the methodology used in this study to test 
the proposed Hypotheses.  In particular, this chapter presents the measures 
proposed for the study and identification of a validated scale for assessing 
purchase intent. The study design is discussed in detail including a description of 
the natural experiment, recruitment of manufacturers and dealers to participate in 
the study by allowing price to be displayed, purchase intent survey recruitment 
and a secondary method for survey data collection. 
The first four Hypotheses will be examined in a natural experiment 
working with a national third-party product website including display listings and 
detailed product description pages for new recreational boats (a high priced, high 
involvement product) and naturally occurring lead generation on the website. The 
fifth and six Hypotheses will be tested using a survey of leads naturally generated 
from the website to assess purchase intent.   
The national third-party product website is primarily supported by 
recreational powerboat dealers who pay for the new product listings on the 
website. The third-party product website attracts 4.8 million visitors, on average, 
per month, experiences 17.5 million page views, on average, per month, and 
experiences 11 million detailed product page views, on average, per month.  
Approximately one percent of visitors to this third-party website are converted to 
email or phone leads for the dealers.  This experiment was conducted during a 
five-week period in January and February, 2019 when total page views of new 
boat listings average over thirty million per month.   These are also primary 
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months when boat shows are held around the country and search activity is high. 
The visitors to this website include actual consumers in the product evaluation 
and search stage of their purchase journey.   
Measures 
 Measures of the independent variable, objective offering price, include 
present or absent. There are three dependent variables: continued product attribute 
search measured as a click from the listing on the search results page to the 
detailed product page; lead generation measured as a click from the detailed 
product page to send an email or phone a dealer, becoming a lead; and purchase 
intention measured with a three item, seven-point Likert scale, anchored at “very 
low” and very high,” adopted from Grewal, et al., (1998). This scale had a 
Chronbach alpha of .92 in the Grewal, et al., (1998) study indicating a high level 
of scale reliability.  The scale items are:  
 1) If I were going to buy a boat, the probability of buying this model is,  
2) The probability that I would consider buying this boat is, and  
3) The likelihood that I would purchase a boat is.    
Study design 
A national third-party website agreed to cooperate on this research.  The 
national third-party website is the largest online boating marketplace in the United 
States for new and pre-owned boats. Through search engine optimization, online 
advertising and email nurture marketing, the national third-party website drives 
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prospective boat buyers to the website to do their research for a boat purchase. 
They claim to reach six million prospective boat buyers each month.  Dealers 
contract with the third-party website to host the dealer’s product listings on the 
website and dealers may either list an objective selling price or display “Request a 
Price” in lieu of listing a price.     
In the data field designed for price to be displayed, for each product listing 
on the search results page and on the detailed product page, dealers also have the 
option to show “Request a Price” instead of displaying a price. “Request a Price” 
literally allows the visitor to contact a dealer to discuss the price of the product 
offered and being viewed/searched.   “Request a Price” on the search results page 
hyperlinks to the detailed product page where there is a dialogue box the visitor 
completes with first and last name, email and phone number (optional) and then 
clicks on “Contact the Seller” to become a lead. Once on the detailed product 
page, if the visitor hovers over “Request a Price” it brings the same lead dialogue 
box to the center of the screen.  A sample search results page is shown in Figure 
4.  A sample detailed product page is shown in Figure 5.  And, a sample lead 
dialogue box in the center of the screen is shown in Figure 6. 
Recruitment of Manufacturers and Dealers  
In addition to the national third-party website, twenty-five manufacturers 
were contacted about participating in the research.  An email briefly explaining 
the research project was sent to the CEO of each of the twenty-five manufacturers 
that included a request for a follow-up phone call to discuss the project.  All 
twenty-five manufacturer CEOs accepted the follow-up phone call where the 
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project was discussed, questions were answered, views on displaying objective 
price were discussed and interest in participation was determined. Nineteen of the 
twenty-five powerboat brands, representing 76% of manufacturers recruited, 
agreed to participate in this experiment.  These nineteen manufacturers produce 
product in eight powerboat segments (aluminum fishing boats, pontoon boats, 
jetboats, bowriders, saltwater fishing boats, small cruisers, ski and wakeboard 
boats, large yachts).  In agreeing to participate, the manufacturers agreed to 
recruit their dealers and identify which of their dealers would participate in the 
experiment, based on the objective offering price each manufacturer would allow 
to be used for each powerboat model in the test.   Each participating manufacturer 
provided a list of their dealers agreeing to participate including information on the 
dealer contact who would work with the author and the third-party website.  The 
author communicated directly with each dealer on the process for participation. 
The test involved 2,396 new boat listings from one hundred and seventy new 
powerboat dealers.  Descriptive statistics for the industry participants in the study 
are shown in Table 1. 
For this research, only manufacturers and dealers who do not display price 
were recruited for participation.  The participating dealer product listings on the 
national third-party website were all originally “Request a Price” listings.  For this 
experiment, the new product listings for participating dealers were modified to 
provide duplicate identical listings of product information with the only difference 
in the product listings being the display of an objective offering price on one 
version of the product listing for each product and no objective offering price (or 
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“Request a Price”) on an otherwise identical version of the product listing for 
each product (control group).  Dealers’ ability to advertise an objective offering 
price is limited by contract with their manufacturers providing them the product.  
So, the objective offering price displayed for each boat model in the test was a 
price approved by the manufacturer and agreed to by the dealer.   
A flowchart describing the study design is shown in Figure 3. 
The Experiment 
About thirty days in advance of the start of the test, the third-party national 
website prepared a spreadsheet of each participating dealer’s listings displayed on 
the website.  Each dealer was asked to complete the spreadsheet by indicating 
their offering price, approved by their product manufacturer, on the spreadsheet 
and return it to the national third-party website no later than two weeks before the 
start of the test.  The third-party website tracked responses and shared them with 
the author, who was responsible to follow up with each dealer to make sure their 
completed spreadsheets were returned on time. 
Optimizely is an experimentation platform for testing digital experiences 
(for more information visit www.optimizely.com).  Among its many capabilities 
is A/B experimentation on web pages.  All of the listings in the test with the 
objective offering price provided by the dealer, in the spreadsheets they were 
provided, were uploaded to Optimizely by the national third-party website for this 
experiment.  During the test period, all visitors to the national third-party website 
randomly and alternately received a cookie to designate them to see price or not 
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see price when they encountered listings in the test during their product search on 
the website.   The Optimizely software controlled the display of the product 
listings (included in the test) with and without the objective offering price based 
on the cookie placed on the visitor.    
The third-party national website assigned a unique identifier to each 
visitor to the website that allowed tracking of their unique clickstream.   Each 
product listing in the test that appeared on a visitor’s search results page, with and 
without objective offering price, was tracked in Google Analytics, which was 
used in conjunction with Optimizely to provide clickstream data on the listing 
viewed on the search results page.  The clickstream data indicated whether the 
visitor saw a listing in its original state (without price) or in its treatment state 
(with price).  Product listings in the test appeared on visitor search results pages 
54,681 times.  In the normal course of a visit to the national third-party website, 
visitors typically do multiple searches and the same product listing could appear 
on the visitor’s search results page more than once.   Based on the cookie placed 
on the visitor, they were always either in the treatment group (objective price 
visible) or the control group (objective price not visible). 
Visitors to a product listing on the search results page have the opportunity 
to search further for additional product attributes by clicking forward to a detailed 
product page for the listing.   This click was the measure of continued search for 
product attributes.   Each click to the detailed product page from a search results 
page was also tracked in Google Analytics, which was used with Optimizely to 
provide clickstream data on the detailed listings viewed.  The clickstream data 
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indicated whether the visitor saw a listing in its original state (without price) or in 
its treatment state (with price).  Visitors to the website clicked through from a 
listing in the test on the search results page to the detail product listing 22,496 
times.  This represents a 41% clickthrough rate from search results listing to detail 
product listing.  There were 22,205 unique individuals who continued searching 
to the detail product listing from the search results page. 
From the detail product page, visitors have the ability to click to send an 
email to a dealer or phone a dealer for more information, at which point they 
become a lead for that dealer.  This click is the measure of lead generation.  
Visitors clicking on the detailed product listing for products in the test, clicked to 
email or phone a dealer from the detail listing page 184 times.  This represents 
137 email leads and 47 phone leads with a clickthrough rate to become a lead of 
0.8%, which is very consistent with the nearly 1% lead generation rate for all 
listings on the third-party website.  Some visitors clicked to become a lead for the 
same product with the same dealer.  After deleting these duplicate leads, there 
were 165 unique leads remaining, including 118 email leads and 47 phone leads.  
Because of the unique Visitor ID assigned to each visitor and the unique Product 
ID assigned to each product listing, there is traceability by individual from a 
product listing on the search results page to the detail product page, to clicking to 
email or phone a dealer which represents a lead.  The unique identifiers of Visitor 
ID and Product ID allowed for matching the clickstream data from the search 
results page, the detail listing page and the lead generated to be matched for 
analysis. 
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Email Survey Recruitment and Incentive 
Only the 118 email leads could be followed up with a survey.  Each email 
lead was sent a recruitment email by the national third-party website, using their 
Saleforce.com capability to include a survey link in the recruitment email.  
Salesforce.com also allowed the unique Visitor ID assigned to each visitor by the 
third-party national website and the unique Product ID for the listing viewed to be 
embedded in the survey link.  The survey was developed in Qualtrics and was 
enabled to receive these unique embedded IDs in each survey response. The 
purchase intent survey is included as Appendix A and the recruitment email is 
included as Appendix C.   
A $10.00 Starbucks gift card was offered in the recruitment email as an 
incentive to complete the survey.   The Starbucks gift cards were purchased and 
fulfilled through Rybbon.net, an online service that provides incentives for 
completion of surveys (and other research and marketing activities) automatically 
and instantly by email.  At the conclusion of the survey, respondents sent their 
email address to Rybbon.net and received an electronic gift card directly from 
Rybbon.net.  The individual responses to the survey were matched to and 
combined with measures from the individual clickstream data for analysis using 
the unique Visitor ID and Product ID embedded in the survey results.  
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Secondary Method of Survey Data Collection  
To enhance and strengthen the survey response on purchase intent, a 
secondary method of data collection was also employed.  The national third-party 
website normally experiences lead generation equal to about 1% of detailed page 
views.  Expecting an 8-10% response rate to the recruitment email, there was 
concern that insufficient survey response would be obtained through the primary 
data collection pathway. To enrich the perspective on purchase intent provided by 
the surveys, the author worked with the third-party website to augment the survey 
sample. The third-party website randomly selected 9,588 additional unique 
visitors, who became email leads outside the experiment, to receive the 
recruitment email with the survey link.  A total of 9,706 recruitment emails were 
sent (9,588 randomly selected in the secondary method and 118 from the visitors 
in the test).  This total included 4,601 leads on new boat listings (model year 2019 
or 2020) who were sent a recruitment email. A unique Visitor ID assigned to 
these randomly selected leads was embedded in the survey link included in the 
recruitment email and embedded in the survey responses from these email leads 
by Qualtrics, to allow matching of survey responses to a list of VisitorIDs, 
provided by the third-party website, that included the type of listing (with or 
without price) the visitor had viewed. 
A total of 252 usable surveys were received from respondents viewing 
new boat listings (model year 2019 and 2020), including 187 respondents in the 
control group (did not see price) and 84 in the treatment group (did see price).  
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This represents a survey response rate of 5.5% to the recruitment email.  
Descriptive statistics for the sample are shown in Table 2. 
 The 252 respondents were primarily in the age range of  35-55 (49.6%), 
were predominantly male (87%) and living with  a spouse or partner (81.7%), 
were highly educated with sixty-eight percent reporting having a college 
education with an Associates Degree or above, had three or more people living in 
their household (50%), and were slightly skewed to annual household incomes of 
$100,000 or greater (55.1%).  Descriptive statistics for the survey respondents are 
shown in Table 3. 
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Results 
This chapter provides the results of the Hypothesis testing.  Hypotheses 1 
through 4 were tested using a one sample t-test and Hypotheses 5 and 6 were 
tested using an independent samples t-test. 
The context of this study, is new boat listings on a major national third-
party website where objective price is normally not provided by the new boat 
dealer.  This industry sells high cost, high involvement products (new boats).  In 
addition to not providing cost information on this national third-party website, it 
is also common practice for dealers and manufacturers not to include objective 
selling price for new boat listings on their own websites either.   
For this reason, only surveys from leads on model year 2019 and 2020 
boats (252 surveys) were used in the analysis to ensure that only surveys returned 
by respondents who had viewed new boat listings were analyzed.  This aligns 
with industry practice to distinguish between new and used boat listings on the 
national third-party website.  Dealers offering pre-owned boats and new boats that 
are not current model year may display an objective offering price of their 
choosing on third-party websites as well as their own website.  Manufacturers do 
not control pricing for pre-owned boats or new boats that are not current model 
year.  
Test of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 Hypotheses 1 and 2 state that consumer search is negatively influenced by 
the absence of an objective offering price and positively influenced by the 
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presence of an objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product 
as demonstrated by continued search for other product attributes.  Operationally, 
this suggests that consumers searching for product information for a high price, 
high involvement product will be more likely to click through from the search 
results page product listing to the detailed product listing if objective price 
information is provided in the search results page listing. 
 To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, a one-sample t-test was conducted 
to examine whether presence of price information induced respondents to 
continue searching for additional product attributes by clicking from the listing on 
the search results page to a detail product listing for the boat viewed on the search 
results page.  22,205 individuals continued searching for additional product 
attributes.  Within that sample, respondents were more likely to continue 
searching if they were provided with objective price information (mean difference 
= .58, 95% CI of mean difference = .57-.58, t = 174.17, df = 22,204, p < .01).   
 These results are robust to differentiating between the extent of continued 
search when objective offering price is present and when objective offering price 
is absent. They support Hypotheses 1 and 2.  The consumer on the purchase 
journey who is provided objective offering price continues their search for 
product attributes, by clicking through to the detail product listing, at a 
significantly higher rate than the consumer who is not provided an objective 
offering price on their purchase journey.  
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Test of Hypotheses 3 and 4 
 Hypothesis 3 and 4 state that fewer leads will be generated in the absence 
of an objective offering price and that more leads will be generated in the 
presence of an objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product.  
In this test, leads were measured as a click on the “Contact the Seller” button from 
the detail product page on the national third-party website and entry of personal 
email address or phone number. Operationally, this suggests that consumers 
searching for product information for a high price, high involvement product will 
be more likely to click to become a lead from the detailed product listing if 
objective price information is provided in the product listing. 
 To test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, one-sample t-test was conducted to 
examine whether presence of price information increased the likelihood of a 
respondent becoming a lead.  165 unique individuals became leads by clicking on 
the “Contact the Seller” button on the detail product listing and entered their 
email address or phone number.  Within that sample, respondents were more 
likely to become a lead if they were provided with objective price information 
(mean difference = .35, 95% CI of mean difference = .28-.43, t = 9.43, df = 164, p 
< .01).    
 These results are robust to differentiating between lead generation when 
objective offering price is present and when objective offering price is absent.  
The results support Hypotheses 3 and 4.  The consumer on the purchase journey 
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who is provided objective offering price becomes a lead, by clicking the “Contact 
the Seller” button and providing their email address or phone number, at a 
significantly higher rate than the consumer who is not provided an objective 
offering price on their purchase journey.  
Test of Hypotheses 5 and 6 
 Hypotheses 5 and 6 state that purchase intent will be weaker in the 
absence of an objective offering price and that purchase intent will be stronger in 
the presence of an objective offering price for a high price, high involvement 
product.  In this test, leads were recruited to take a brief, twenty question survey 
to assess their purchase intent as a proxy for sales.  The three items used to assess 
purchase intent were measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = very low to 7 = 
very high; alpha reliability of .71).  The average time to complete the survey was 
about three minutes. 
 Hypotheses 5 and 6 were examined using an independent sample t-test.  
Purchase intent of the respondents was greater when participants were provided 
with objective offering price during their purchase journey (mean = 5.33)) than 
when they were not (mean = 4.97).  This mean difference was significant 
(Lavene’s test indicated equality of variances (F = .57, p > .05); mean difference 
= -.36, 95% CI of mean difference = -.65 - -.07, t = 2.444, df = 249).   
 These results support Hypotheses 5 and 6 that providing an objective 
offering price during the search portion of the purchase journey will lead to 
greater purchase intent (from a greater number of leads as supported by 
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Hypotheses 3 and 4) than hiding price and making it more difficult, if not 
impossible, to find an objective offering price.   
 With all six Hypotheses supported by the analysis, there is evidence that 
displaying an objective offering price with product listings on a national third-
party website will increase the extent of search, increase lead generation for 
dealers and manufacturers, and positively influence purchase intent such that  
respondents who searched for price and found it have greater intention to 
purchase.  A table of means, mean differences, confidence intervals and 
Chronbach alpha are shown in Table 4. 
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Discussion 
 This chapter provides a discussion of the results, as well as the theoretical 
and managerial implications of the findings from this research.  Limitations of the 
research are discussed and future directions are proposed as part of the concluding 
comments on this study. 
General Discussion 
 This study investigates the impact of hidden, or unpublished, prices on the 
evaluation stage of the purchase journey for high cost, high involvement products.  
Specifically, it looks at the impact of missing prices on continued search, lead 
generation and purchase intent in the context of new boat sales.  New boats are a 
high cost, high involvement product.  The results provide evidence that for high 
cost, high involvement products the absence of objective selling price in the 
evaluation phase of the purchase journey leads to less consumer search for 
product attributes, less lead generation and less purchase intent, while the 
presence of objective selling price leads to more search, more lead generation and 
higher purchase intent. 
 Nearly all of the research in the areas of consumer search, the impact of 
knowledge uncertainty on the extent of search, pricing theory, and purchase intent 
assumes that objective price information is readily available for search in the 
purchase journey.   In this long stream of research, no one has empirically looked 
at the impact of missing prices on the evaluation and search phase of the purchase 
journey and related lead generation and purchase intent.  Owen (2003) points out 
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in his exploratory work on missing prices that there are many situations 
encountered by consumers where price information is missing or hidden.   This 
study is the first empirical test of the impact on consumer behavior when 
objective price is missing or hidden. 
 Price is a critical determinant of deal valuation, perceived value, 
transaction value, acquisition value, formation of internal reference price, the 
extent of search, purchase intent, and sales.  Much of the rich learnings in these 
areas of study are based on objective price being readily available.  When 
objective price is not available, how does the consumer evaluate the deal, arrive at 
perceived value, make an assessment of transaction value and acquisition value, 
or form an internal reference price?  While there is no evidence presented here 
that some or all of these processes may be disrupted when objective selling price 
is missing, it suggests that such an assumption might be reasonable. If these 
processes are disrupted when objective selling price is missing, that likely leads to 
consumers abandoning their search and path to purchase; if not completely, at 
least until later.  No business wants to do anything to delay a purchase, yet the 
common practice in some industries of hiding price likely has that impact based 
on the evidence from this study.  Missing information, particularly objective 
price, that lengthens the purchase journey is not in the best interests of the seller. 
 Encouraging search to the point of preparedness to purchase is desirable if 
the goal is to sell more product.  This study demonstrates that providing objective 
price during the evaluation stage of the purchase journey, rather than hiding it, 
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will encourage continued search for product attributes, likely advancing the 
consumer on their path to purchase and improving their preparedness to purchase. 
 One would expect that the more qualified leads a dealer receives and the 
higher the purchase intent of those leads, the more opportunity the dealer has to 
close sales and the more sales a dealer will close.  The findings in this study that 
the presence of price leads to more search for product attributes suggests that 
sellers of high cost, high involvement products that hide price are reducing 
consumer search related to their product offering.  Owen (2003) suggests that 
failing to provide an objective offering price can leave buyers feeling manipulated 
or forced to engage in a social interaction with a dealer they are not yet prepared 
for.  The findings in this study empirically confirm that continued search is 
delayed, derailed or terminated, potentially ending the purchase journey, when 
objective offering price is absent.   
 Inasmuch as the results of this study show that hiding price reduces search 
for product attributes, it also shows that hiding price reduces lead generation and 
purchase intent.  Purchases of high cost, high involvement products are deliberate 
purchases.  The purchased time frame can be six, twelve or even twenty-four 
months.  New boat dealers, and likely sellers of other high cost, high involvement 
products, depend on leads as the lifeblood of their business.  The evidence from 
this field study indicates that hiding price does reduce lead generation, as 
consumers who did not see price were not as likely to become leads as consumers 
who did see price.  Fewer leads means fewer sales opportunities and likely fewer 
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sales.  Extrapolate the impact on a single dealer to an entire industry and the 
potential lost sales could be significant!  
 The research from Discover Boating suggests that only two percent of 
potential first-time boat buyers who begin their purchase journey complete the 
journey with the purchase of a boat (Discover Boating, 2017).  An increase from 
2% to 3% completing their journey with a purchase would lead to a 50% increase 
in first-time boat buyers and a 4% increase in annual sales of new boats.  This is 
significant for an industry where new boats sales grow by 5-6% annually on 
average. 
Finally, this study provides evidence that when objective price is present, 
the purchase intent of leads is significantly higher.  Leads with higher purchase 
intent likely lead to higher close rates and therefore higher sales.  Extant research 
has shown that purchase intent is a good proxy for sales.  And, new boats map to 
all six factors identified by Morwitz, et al. (2007) that are associated with a strong 
correlation between purchase intentions and actual purchase.   
This study looked at two distinct purchase journeys for buyers of new 
boats.  In one purchase journey, consumers were provided an objective offering 
price.  In the other purchase journey, consumers were not provided an objective 
offering price.  The findings show that consumers who were provided an 
objective offering price moved further through the evaluation stage of the 
purchase journey.  They conducted more search by clicking through to the detail 
listing page.  They were more likely to become leads by contacting a dealer from 
the detail listing page.  And, they were measured with higher purchase intent, a 
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common proxy for actual purchase.  The behavior of consumers who saw price 
was significantly different from the behavior of consumers who did not see price.  
These findings suggest, that in the internet era of consumer expectations for 
transparency, missing prices could be limiting sales of new boats and other high 
cost, high involvement products where price is missing in the evaluation stage of 
the purchase journey. 
Nunes, et al., (2103) state, “The new Rule #1 is, know your customer’s 
behavior on their path to purchase (p. 50).”  The findings of this study provide 
valuable information to help sellers of high cost, high involvement products to 
better understand their customer’s behavior on their path to purchase!  The results 
of this study demonstrate that the behaviors of consumers do differ when 
objective price is not available, increasing knowledge uncertainty.  This evidence 
should be useful to managers contemplating a change in their policy of hiding 
objective selling price online and in product literature. 
Theoretical contribution 
 This study makes four theoretical contributions to the literature.  First, a 
review of the literature suggests this is the first empirical test of the impact of 
missing prices on continued search for product attributes, lead generation, and 
purchase intent for high cost, high involvement products.  While there is a 
substantial body of work on pricing, search and purchase intent, until now there 
has been a dearth of scenarios studied where objective price is missing.  This 
study is unique in providing understanding of the impact of missing prices on the 
purchase journey and fills in missing information in the extant literature. 
67 | P a g e  
 
 Second, this study adds to the understanding of the impact of price on 
purchase intent by considering the impact on purchase intent when objective price 
is missing.  Purchase intent has been studied in many contexts and extant research 
addresses the role of price perceptions on behavioral intentions, generally, and 
purchase intentions, specifically.  Research has demonstrated that price plays a 
significant role in explaining consumer purchase intent (Erikson, et al., 1985).  A 
behavioral perspective of price concludes that price affects perceived value 
(through its impact on acquisition value and transaction value) and perceived 
value positively influences purchase intent (Grewal, et al., 1998; Compeau et al., 
1998; Chandrashekaran, 2004).  As in other areas of pricing research, research on 
the role of price in explaining consumer purchase intent has assumed objective 
price is present. But, what impact does the absence of price have on consumer 
purchase intent? What role can price play in influencing purchase intent when 
price is not available?  This study measures the impact on purchase intent for a 
high cost, high involvement product when price is not available and concludes 
that the absence of objective price negatively influences purchase intent for a high 
cost, high involvement consumer product.  This fills a gap in the stream of pricing 
and purchase intent research and literature. 
 Third, this study was conducted as a field experiment with random 
assignment to obtain unbiased measures of continued search, lead generation and 
purchase intent for a high cost, high involvement product in a natural, online 
context, overcoming the limitations of using observational data.  There tend to be 
fewer field experiments with random assignment because, as List and Gneezy 
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(2014) point out, “running [field] experiments is a costly undertaking (p. 16).” 
The experiment was done in a natural setting in which consumers who are 
searching for information on a new boat purchase visit a national third-party 
website in the normal course of their daily lives.  Visitors to the national third-
party website were randomly assigned to the treatment group (to see objective 
price) or the control group (did not see objective price).  This random assignment 
facilitates causal inference by making the two samples randomly similar to each 
other so that subjects in the treatment group and control group will both have the 
same average characteristics.   
  Fourth, this study is a field experiment with random assignment, so the 
results are based on consumer behaviors in two distinct, real-world purchase 
journeys (real consumers considering the purchase of real products) rather than on 
decisions consumers “might make” in a hypothetical purchase journey, as tested 
in most other studies.  Consequently, this study furthers the understanding of the 
extent to which information (and in this case price information) drives the 
behavior of buyers in the marketplace as was suggested by Urbany (1986).  It is 
also responsive to Owens’ call for future research using the internet to test the 
impact of missing prices (Owens, 2003). 
Managerial contribution 
 The findings of this study, while intuitive, are completely contrary to 
conventional wisdom in the recreational boating industry where most 
manufacturers and dealers do not provide objective price on their own websites or 
third-party websites, or in product literature.  The results of this study demonstrate 
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that providing objective price encourages continued search and is more likely to 
generate leads and greater purchase intent. It provides evidence to managers who 
are (or should be) considering a fundamental change in their approach to omitting 
objective price.  This research provides strong support to suggest reconsideration 
of pricing strategy in consumer products industries, offering high cost, high 
involvement products, where it is still common practice not to advertise objective 
selling price. 
 Making objective price available during the evaluation phase of the 
purchase journey, in a transparent manner consistent with the internet age, could 
positively impact product sales in a significant manner, not only for individual 
manufacturers and dealers but for entire industries such as the recreational boating 
industry and similar industries that sell high cost, high involvement products and 
hide price. 
Limitations and future research 
 This study is subject to limitations. This study does not follow the 
purchase journey to the conclusion of a purchase.  While recognizing this 
weakness, all of the factors associated with a strong correlation between purchase 
intentions and actual purchase identified by Morwitz, et al., (2007) are present for 
the product used in this experiment, significantly mitigating this weakness.  
However, the conclusions of this study could be strengthened by following the 
third-party website visitors who become leads for six to twenty-four months to 
determine if there is a significant difference in actual sales based on seeing price 
or not seeing price during the evaluation stage of the purchase journey.  Allowing 
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the experiment to run an extended time is not likely to alter the findings but would 
allow for testing the impact of missing prices on sales.  A more longitudinal 
approach to this study should be considered.  This is an area for future researchers 
to explore. 
Though new boats are a high cost, high involvement product, the context 
of this study may not be generalizable to other industries that sell high cost, high 
involvement products and hide price during the evaluation stage of the path to 
purchase.  Although there are few remaining industries that obscure price in their 
advertising (online and otherwise), the results of this study should provide 
evidence and context to encourage other industries to consider advancing similar 
research as they consider whether their current practices are still valid. 
In this study, the decision was made to place a cookie on visitors to the 
website so that each visitor would only see listings with price or without price, not 
both. The results, therefore, apply to differences between individuals who saw 
price and did not see price. This research did not consider differences in behavior 
within an individual for whom price was visible for some products and not visible 
for others.  Future research should test differences in behavior related to seeing 
price and not seeing price within individuals rather than differences between 
individual as was done in this study.  Although there is no expectation that the 
findings  would be different,  a study of the difference in behavior within an 
individual for whom price was visible for some products and not for others, would 
provide evidence of the competitive impact  on companies that hold out from 
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providing objective price as others in their industry change their pricing practices 
based on the evidence provided by this study. 
The focus of this study is on high-cost, high involvement consumer 
products and B2C communication of objective selling price.  A Google search of 
“should I publish my prices online” generates an active online discussion among 
small B2B businesses about whether to display prices on their website.  It appears 
that the lack of objective price information in the B2B marketplace is even more 
widespread than in the B2C marketplace.  Future researchers could study the 
impact of missing prices on continued search, lead generation and sales in the 
B2B marketplace.   
Another potentially productive area of research would be the impact of 
missing prices on search engine optimization and the ability to generate traffic to 
your website.  Do companies who discuss pricing on their website generate more 
web traffic than companies who do not discuss pricing on their website. 
 As happens in the marketplace every day, each manufacturer and their 
dealer determined the objective price to be included in the new boat product 
listing for this study.  Future research could explore the impact of price elasticity 
on continued search, lead generation, purchase intent and sales for high cost, high 
involvement products.  For industries where MSRP is well above actual selling 
price, it would be helpful to understand if there is an ideal offering price (such as 
Minimum Advertised Price), in terms of dealer margin, from the point of view of 
the impact of price elasticity on the dependent variables studied, and sales. 
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 Finally, researchers might look at how hiding price impacts consumer trust 
and firm reputation as well as ethical considerations of hiding price. Indounas 
(2008) investigated pricing practices and examined differences between 
companies which perceived pricing decisions do entail ethical considerations and 
those that do not hold such a belief.  He concluded “that a corporate culture that 
facilitates a customer orientation towards pricing decisions” is more effective in 
meeting consumer needs (Indounas 2008, p. 169).  Pricing decisions entail ethical 
considerations. Hiding prices is designed to force the buyer to make contact with 
a dealer to learn about price.  This approach focuses solely on the needs of the 
company and not the needs of the buyer. 
  “Companies that do perceive that pricing decisions are related to ethical 
considerations tend to follow a more balanced approach when setting prices by 
pursuing both customer- and competition-oriented pricing objectives, without, 
however, overlooking financial objectives (Indounas 2008, p. 161).”  Future 
research could seek to learn whether owners and managers of companies that hide 
price perceive there is an ethical consideration in their decision to hide price.  
Have owners and managers considered what they might have to gain by avoiding 
pricing practices (hiding price) that might have ethical considerations and the 
potential ethical implications of their pricing decisions and the impact on 
consumer trust and firm reputation? 
There is an ongoing debate within businesses, and among business leaders, 
about the efficacy of hiding price from potential buyers.  This practice is evident   
in a few remaining industries of significance that sell high cost, high involvement 
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products to consumers.  And, may be even more prevalent in B2B marketplaces 
based on Google searches of the topic.  This study provides evidence for 
reconsidering the practice of hiding price for high cost, high involvement 
consumer products (and in particular, for new boats).  Replication of this research 
in other industries offering high cost, high involvement consumer products will 
likely be needed to change this business practice in remaining B2C markets.  
Replication in B2B markets could provide evidence to help business managers 
make an important, and scary, decision to be more transparent in their pricing 
strategy. This study has shown that price visibility does lead to more search, more 
leads and greater purchase intent.  If future studies support this evidence in other 
B2C markets and in B2B markets, the impact on sales for businesses that 
currently hide price could be significant.   This study opens a fertile area for 
future research. 
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Appendix A 
Survey of Purchase Intent for Leads 
 
 
 
Start of Block: Welcome to the Survey on Your Purchase Journey 
 
  
We are interested in understanding the boat purchase journey for purchasers of new 
boats. This survey should take you around 3 minutes to complete and you will receive a 
$10.00 Starbucks gift card electronically upon completion and submission of the survey.  
 
 
This research is being conducted by BoatTrader.com and a doctoral student at DePaul 
University for a dissertation. You will be asked to answer some questions relevant 
to  your purchase intent and purchase time frame. You will also be presented a few 
demographic questions for classification purposes only.  Please be assured that your 
responses will be kept completely confidential and in no way identifiable to you.  By 
completing the survey and submitting your answers you are agreeing to participate in 
the research study. 
  
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You can choose not to participate and 
have the right to withdraw at any point during the survey, and for any reason. Once you 
submit your responses, we will no longer be able to remove your data later from the 
study because we will not know which data belongs to you.  If you would like to contact 
the Principal Investigator in the study to discuss this research, please e-mail Thomas J. 
Dammrich at TDAMMRIC@depaul.edu.   
    
By clicking the button below, you are agreeing that your participation in the study is 
voluntary, you are 18 years of age, and that you are aware that you may choose to 
terminate your participation in the study at any time and for any reason.   
 
 Please note that this survey will be best displayed on a laptop or desktop 
computer.  Some features may be less compatible for use on a mobile device. 
 
End of Block: Welcome to the Survey on Your Purchase Journey 
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Start of Block: Let's Get Started 
 
 
Q1 How many boats (powerboats and/or sailboats) have you purchased? 
o None  (0)  
o 1  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3 or more  (3)  
 
 
 
 
Q2 Do you currently own a boat (powerboat, personal watercraft, or sailboat)? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
End of Block: Let's Get Started 
 
Start of Block: Your Recent Visit to BoatTrader.com 
 
 With the following questions we seek to understand your purchase journey for a new 
boat.  On your recent visit to BoatTrader.com you contacted a dealer.  Please answer 
these questions keeping in mind the boat model you contacted a dealer about. 
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Q3 Did you visit a dealer or manufacturer website before visiting BoatTrader.com? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (0)  
 
 
 
 
Q4 Did you see a price on BoatTrader.com for the new boat you contacted the dealer 
about? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (0)  
 
 
 
 
Q5 Have you seen an offering price on the new boat you contacted the dealer about 
other than on BoatTrader.com? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (0)  
 
 
 
 
Q6 Have you searched for other brands and models of new powerboats? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (0)  
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Q7 My knowledge of the price for the new boat I contacted the dealer about is... 
o Very low  (1)  
o Low  (2)  
o Moderate  (3)  
o High  (4)  
o Very high  (5)  
 
 
 
 
 
Q8 I expect to purchase a new boat within the next... 
o 30 Days  (1)  
o 60 days  (2)  
o 90 days  (3)  
o 6 months  (4)  
o 12 months  (5)  
o More than 12 months  (6)  
o Unknown  (7)  
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Q9 If I were going to buy a boat, the probability of buying this model is... 
o Very Low  (1)  
o Low  (2)  
o Somewhat low  (3)  
o Moderate  (4)  
o Somewhat high  (5)  
o High  (6)  
o Very high  (7)  
 
 
 
 
 
Q10 The probability that I would consider buying this boat is... 
o Very Low  (1)  
o Low  (2)  
o Somewhat low  (3)  
o Moderate  (4)  
o Somewhat high  (5)  
o High  (6)  
o Very High  (7)  
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Q11 The probability that I would purchase a boat is... 
o Very Low  (1)  
o Low  (2)  
o Somewhat low  (3)  
o Moderate  (4)  
o Somewhat high  (5)  
o High  (6)  
o Very High  (7)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Very Low 
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Low 
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Somewhat low 
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Moderate 
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Somewhat high 
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = High 
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Very High 
 
Q12 The probability that I would purchase a boat is... 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
Please rate probability from 0% to 100% 
()  
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Q13 What do you expect to pay for the new boat you saw on BoatTrader.com and 
contacted a dealer about? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Q14 Do you consider the new boat you contacted the dealer about to be affordable? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (0)  
 
End of Block: Your Recent Visit to BoatTrader.com 
 
Start of Block: Wrapping It Up 
 
 The following questions are used for classification purposes only. 
 
 
 
 
Q15 What is your age? 
o 18 to 34  (1)  
o 35 to 55  (2)  
o 56 to 65  (3)  
o 66 to 75  (4)  
o 76 or older  (5)  
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Q16 What is your gender? 
o Male  (2)  
o Female  (1)  
 
 
 
 
Q17 Which of the following best describes your current relationship status? 
o Married  (1)  
o Widowed  (2)  
o Divorced  (3)  
o Separated  (4)  
o Single, but cohabiting with a significant other  (5)  
o Single, never married  (6)  
 
 
 
Q18 What is the highest level of school you have completed or highest degree you have 
received? 
o Less than high school diploma  (1)  
o High school diploma or equivalent (e.g., GED)  (2)  
o Some college but no degree  (3)  
o Associate degree  (4)  
o Bachelor degree  (5)  
o Graduate degree  (6)  
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Q19 How many people live in your household? 
o 1  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3  (3)  
o 4  (4)  
o 5  (5)  
o 6 or more  (6)  
 
 
 
 
Q20 What is your approximate annual household income? 
o $0 to $49,999  (1)  
o $50,000 to $74,999  (2)  
o $75,000 to 99,999  (3)  
o $100,000 to $149,999  (4)  
o $150,000 to $199,000  (5)  
o $200,000 and up  (6)  
o Prefer Not to Answer  (7)  
 
 
Q21 What is your zip code? 
________________________________________________________________ 
End of Block: Wrapping It Up 
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Appendix B 
IRB Letters of Approval 
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Appendix C 
Recruitment Email for Survey of Leads 
 
Dear Website Visitor, 
 
 
We are interested in understanding the boat purchase journey for purchasers of 
new boats.  Website is cooperating on research that is being conducted by a 
doctoral student at DePaul University, Chicago, IL. You are receiving this request 
because you recently visited Website and contacted a dealer by email or phone 
about a new boat listing you viewed on Website.   
 
We are asking you to participate in this research by completing a brief survey at 
[insert link].  The survey will take you about 3 minutes to complete and you 
will receive a $10.00 Starbucks gift card electronically immediately upon 
completion of the survey. You will be asked about your current boat ownership, 
purchase intent, purchase time frame and a few demographic questions for 
categorization purposes only. Please be assured that your responses will be kept 
completely confidential and in no way identifiable to you.   
  
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You can choose not to participate 
and have the right to withdraw at any point during the survey, and for any reason. 
If you would like to contact the Principal Investigator in the study to discuss this 
research, please e-mail Thomas J. Dammrich at TDAMMRIC@depaul.edu or call 
him at 312-946-6220. 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact Susan 
Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research Compliance, in the Office 
of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at sloesspe@depaul.edu.  You 
may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if: 
• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the 
research team. 
• You cannot reach the research team. 
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
 
We thank you for your patronage of Website, and if you choose to complete the 
survey, we thank you for your willingness to assist in this important research. 
 
Website.com 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Traditional and Contemporary Purchase Journey 
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Figure 2.  Hypothesized Relationships 
 Independent       Direction of   
 Dependent Variables 
 Variables       Relationship 
1. Continued Product Attribute Search—Hypothesis H1 and H2 
 
2. Lead Generation—Hypothesis H3 and H4 
 
3. Purchase Intent—Hypothesis H5 and H6 
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Figure 3.  Study Design Flowchart 
 
 
 
99 | P a g e  
 
Figure 4.  Sample Search Results Page 
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Figure 5.  Sample Detail Product Page
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Figure 6. Sample Dialogue Box for Lead Data 
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 Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics   
Industry Participants N 
Third-party National Website for New Boat Listings 1 
Manufacturer Boat Brands  19 
Powerboat Segments  8 
New Boat Dealers  170 
New Boat Listings  2,396 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
                             Table 2   
Descriptive Statistics   
Sample N 
Search Results Page Listing Views 54,681 
  
Detailed Product Page Listing Views (continued search) 22,205 
  Clickthrough Rate 41% 
  
Total Leads from Detail Listing Views 165 
       Email Leads 118 
       Phone Leads 47 
       Lead Generation Rate 0.8% 
       Email Leads from Secondary Method 4,483 
       Total Recruitment Emails New Boat Listings 4,601 
  
Survey Completions 252 
      Survey Response Rate 5.5% 
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Table 3 
  
Descriptive Statistics   
Respondents N 
     Age of Respondents  
         18-34 12.7% 
         35-55 49.6% 
         56-65 24.2% 
         Over 65 11.5% 
  
     Male Respondents 87.0% 
  
     Living with Spouse or Partner 81.7% 
  
     College Educated 68.0% 
  
     Three or More People Living in Household 50.0% 
  
     Household Income   
         $0-$99,999 24.2% 
         $100,000 and up 61.1% 
         Prefer Not to Answer 20.7% 
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Table 4 
 
 
Means, Mean Difference, Confidence Interval and Cronbach's Alpha Reliability
Variable N Mean
Mean 
Difference 95% CI t df p value
Chronbach's 
Alpha
1. Continued Search
     a. Control Group (no price displayed) 0
     b. Treatment Group (price displayed) 0.58
2. Lead Generation
       a. Control Group (no price displayed) 0
       b. Treatment Group (price displayed) 0.35
3. Purchase Intent
      a. Control Group (no price displayed) 4.97
      b. Treatment Group (price displayed) 5.33
-0.36 -.65 - -.07
--< .01**
< .01** .71249.002.44
**p  < .01
22,205
165
252
0.58 .57 - .58 174.14 22204.00 < .01** --
0.35 .28 - .43 9.43 164.00
